For a while, it seemed to be going well. In 1998, U.S. officials involved in the implementation of the agreement told Congress that the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency were convinced that there had been “no fundamental violation of any aspect of the framework agreement” by North Korea. On February 22, North Korea threatened to renounce its participation in the agreed framework if the Bush administration adopted an “other” policy toward North Korea than that of the Clinton administration. North Korea accused the United States of not sincerely implementing the agreed framework and stressed that if the United States were to delay implementation again, it would no longer be bound by the agreement. At the time, the United States expressed its readiness to continue dialogue with the DPRK on security issues and to respect the agreed framework. In retrospect, the agreed framework was not the success it seemed to be at the time of its signing. The United States and North Korea have failed to normalize relations and North Korea has regularly blocked IAEA inspections. In October 2002, North Korea acknowledged that it had launched its own uranium-based nuclear weapons program.
The United States, on the other hand, stopped its heavy fuel deliveries and stopped the construction of the light water reactors. In retaliation, North Korea withdrew from the NPT, rejected all IAEA inspectors and reactivated its plutonium program in Yngbyon, ending the agreement. As a result, negotiations on North Korea`s nuclear program have become a broader process, known as six-party talks, including the United States, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia. Among the terms of the pact and the resulting agreements were the closure of the Yongbyon pilot reactor, the abandonment of the construction of two large nuclear power plants, and the waterproofing and waterproofing of spent fuel that could have been synthesized under IAEA supervision to produce plutonium for a nuclear weapon. In return, by 2003, two light water reactors would be built in North Korea at a cost of $4 billion, mainly supplied by South Korea.  Meanwhile, North Korea would be powered by 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year to compensate for lost energy production. North Korea had to fully comply with its IAEA safeguard agreement, which allowed the IAEA to verify the accuracy and completeness of its initial statement before the reactor`s main nuclear components were provided.